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EEA Safety and Security Perspective 01

来源：公众号“智能网联安全”

2021-07-29

1822

[Samuel WENG]

AI, Cybersecurity, and safety investigator

This is series of articles discussing EEA era how the safety and security perspective will perform.

When in one common day, Xiaoming get up early and go to company for work, who work for one OEM in China acting as EE architecture designer. Early getting up cannot heal his mood, after several days of hot debating with his safety colleagues Laura and security colleagues Tom.

They are discussing about how to build up one new development platform in EE architecture and at best way to get functional safety and cybersecurity fusion, as well low cost.

Xiaoming explain a lot that their companyare using Domain Centralized EE architecture, and have sharp budget constraint, and in some domain the ECUs perhaps will suffers from ASIL level or CAL level down. However, Laura will say how critical are those ECUs can not down and the real time operation including FTTI shall be followed, vise verse Tom will say that domain controller did not have enough cybersecurity controls since the private data are hugely collected there even though they are not safety critical.

Finally they cannot get good results and even several weeks, the projects stopped, finally they come to me and we will discussed it.

Chapter 0: Background

Worldwide, almost from 2018, we had gonethrough many innovation technologies like

- V2X

- ADS system

- Software Define Vehicle

Most of us will know the EE architecturewill have following roadmap as highlighted by BOSCH when in 2019:

Chapter 1: Overall ECU functional safety

For common ECUs when in Distributed E/E architecture era, the ECU functional safety classification can be rated as following table, which symbolize 77 ECUs ASIL level and cybersecurity assurance level:

(referto article https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=Mzg5NTIwMTEzOA==&mid=2247484581&idx=1&sn=076b64811576eca1da8bc6f6916427e5&chksm=c012beb8f76537aeb769ae5408fadb91ac0b0d4af76b3e04936a75eebc7eb084d44c014e6b47&token=1293115818&lang=zh_CN#rd)

ID	ECU name	Domain	ASIL	CAL
01	Gateway	Car body comfort	B	4
02	Domain controller	Car body comfort	B	3
03	Intelligent power switch	Car body comfort	B	2
04	T-BOX	Car body comfort	B	3
05	Adaptive head light	Car body comfort	A	1
06	Sunroof motor control module (anti-pinch)	Car body comfort	A	1
07	Body control Module	Car body comfort	B	3
08	Car remote control key	Car body comfort	A	2
09	Intelligent dashboard system	Car body comfort	A	2
10	Electrically controlled seat adjustment system	Car body comfort	B	2
11	Construction machinery controller	Car body comfort	N/A	N/A
12	Door control module	Car body comfort	A	2
13	Air Conditioning control unit	Car body comfort	A	1
14	LKA	Car safe	D	2
15	LCA	Car safe	D	2
16	ACC	Car safe	D	2
17	AEB	Car safe	D	3
18	LDW	Car safe	QM	2
19	FCW	Car safe	B	1
20	DMS	Car safe	B	2
21	APS	Car safe	B	2
22	Night vision	Car safe	B	1
23	Pedestrian protection system	Car safe	A	2
24	Traffic Sign Detection	Car safe	QM	2
25	Blind Spot Detection	Car safe	QM	2
26	Downhill control system	Car safe	B	1
27	APA	Car safe	B	2
28	ALKS	Car safe	D	2
29	mmRADAR	Car safe	B	2
30	LIDAR	Car safe	B	2
31	CAMERA	Car safe	B	2
32	Angle RADAR	Car safe	QM	2
33	Highway Pilot	Car safe	D	2
34	Traffic Jam Pilot	Car safe	D	2
35	Level 4 in close roads	Car safe	D	3
37	Sensor fusion	Car safe	D	2
38	Tire Pressure Monitoring System	Car safe	D	2
39	EPB	Car safe	B	2
40	ESP	Car safe	D	2
41	ABS	Car safe	D	2
42	Intelligent Air Suspension System	Car safe	B	2
43	Electronic hydraulic steering control system	Car safe	B	2
44	EPS	Car safe	D	2
45	Steering wheel Angle sensor	Car safe	C	2
46	Autonomous parking system	Car safe	C	2
47	Electronic brake assist	Hybrid power	D	2
48	VCU	Hybrid power	C	2
49	Vehicle Motor control system in new energy vehicle	Hybrid power	D	2
50	Brushless DC motor controller	Hybrid power	D	2
51	Extender control system	Hybrid power	B or C	2
52	OBC-DCDC for electric vehicle	Hybrid power	B	2
53	Integrated power control unit for electric vehicle	Hybrid power	C	2
54	Remote Monitoring and Data Service System for electric vehicle	Hybrid power	B	3
55	BMS	Hybrid power	D	2
56	Engine Management System	Hybrid power	D	3
57	Electronic clutch	Powertrain	B	2
58	Electric pump	Powertrain	A	1
59	Engine control unit	Powertrain	D	3
60	Diesel engine reprocessing control system	Powertrain	C	2
61	High pressure common rail system control unit of diesel engine	Powertrain	N/A	N/A
62	AMT (Automatic Mechanical Transmission control unit)	Powertrain	C	3
63	TCM (Transmission system)	Powertrain	C	3
64	CAN FD	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	2
65	CAN HS	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	2
66	LIN	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	2
67	ETHERNET	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	3
68	FLEXRAY	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	2
69	MOST	Common Service	depends on detail service or functionality	2
70	12V POWER SUPPLY	Common Service	D	2
71	High dimension map	Car safe	D	4
72	Bluetooth	Common Service	QM	2
73	WIFI	Common Service	QM	2
74	Cellular communication	Common Service	QM	4
75	V2X	Common Service	B	4
76	OTA Server	Backend	SIL4	4
77	PKI allocation	Backend	SIL4	4

EE architecture can be rated as, and ASIL level classification rated as following:

Adding up the ASIL level, it will be

If considering the CAL level, it will be

Usually we will list out the state of arttechnical mechanisms using in ECUs:

Normally there will be mechanisms adopting for different levels of methodology:

Classification	Safety mechanisms	Cybersecurity control
ASILD	For communication in Ethernet: end to end communication protection Alive counter, time out warning, CRC(32) Hamming distance >=4 CAN: E2E, CRC 16bit Hamming distance >=4 Hamming weight >=4 E-GAS architecture or redundant processors + actuators
ASILC	For communication in Ethernet: end to end communication protection Alive counter, time out warning, CRC(16) Hamming distance >=4 CAN: E2E, CRC 16bit Hamming distance >=4 Hamming weight >=3 E-GAS architecture or redundant processors
ASILB	For communication in Ethernet: end to end communication protection Alive counter, time out warning, CRC(8) Hamming distance >=3 CAN: E2E, CRC 8bit Hamming distance >=3 Hamming weight >=2 Single core with sufficient safety mechanisms
ASILA	For communication in Ethernet: end to end communication protection Alive counter, time out warning, CRC(4) Hamming distance >=2 CAN: E2E, CRC 4bit Hamming distance >=2 Hamming weight >=2 Single core with sufficient safety mechanisms
CAL4		Firewall mandatory for external attack surface IDPS proposed When in OTA, PKCS or PUF requested, back up memory mandatory and regression mechanisms can be completely accepted Symmetric encryption not OK RSA >=2048 ECC>=256 Pentest and TARA shall perform longer than half year Using development cost can up to 3 times of asset value Secure boot, secure storage, secure driving, secure separation etc
CAL3		Firewall mandatory for external attack surface IDPS proposed When in OTA, PKCS or PUF requested, back up memory mandatory and regression mechanisms can be completely accepted Symmetric encryption not OK RSA >=2048 ECC>=256 Pentest and TARA shall perform longer than 4month Using development cost can up to 2 times of asset value
CAL2		When in OTA, PKCS or PUF requested Symmetric encryption AES 256 Pentest and TARA shall perform longer than 3month Using development cost can up to 1.5 times of asset value
CAL1		When in OTA, PKCS or PUF requested Symmetric encryption AES 256 OR 128 Pentest and TARA shall perform longer than 2month Using development cost can up to 1 times of asset value

We will stop here and then to see more in the next article.

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